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Marx, Justice, and The Dialectic 
Method 
P H I L I P  J.  KAIN 
AN INTERESTING CONTROVERSY has recently been provoked by Allen Wood. 
He argues that capitalism, for Marx, "cannot be faulted as far as justice is 
concerned." For Marx, the concept of  justice belonging to any society is 
rooted in, grows out of, and expresses that particular society's mode of  
production. Justice is not a standard by which human reason in the abstract 
measures actions or institutions--there is no eternal, unchanging norm of 
justice. Each social epoch gives rise to its own standard; each generally lives 
up to it; and each must be measured by this standard alone. Thus, in Wood's 
view, capitalism is perfectly just for Marx.' 
Nor does Wood think that the capitalist's appropriation of  surplus value 
is taken to be unjust by Marx. In capitalist society, the worker is generally 
paid the full value of  his or her labor power. The value of  labor power is 
determined, like the value of  any other commodity, by the amount of  labor 
time required for its production, here, what it takes to keep the laborer alive 
and working. The exchange between capitalist and worker is assumed to be 
an exchange of  equivalents and, as Wood says, is, in Marx's opinion, "no 
injustice at all" to the worker. It is true that the laborer is not paid the value 
of  the product which is produced--a  value which would be. higher than the 
value of  the worker's labor power. The difference between these two sums is 
appropriated by the capitalist and is the source of  surplus value. But in 
capitalist society, according to Wood, the worker is not due this extra sum. 
The capitalist purchases labor power from the worker, not finished prod- 
ucts. The exchange between worker and capitalist is thus an exchange of  
t A. W. Wood, "The Marxian Critique of Justice" (hereafter "Critique") in Marx, Justice, 
and Histo~: A "Philosophy and Public Affairs" Reader (hereafter MJH), ed. M. Cohen, T. Nagel, 
and T. Scanlon (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 198o ), 3, 13, t5-16- A. W. Wood, "Marx 
on Right and Justice: A Reply to Husami" (hereafter "Reply") in MJH, Io7--109. 
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equivalents, and according to Wood it is a just  transaction, both for capital- 
ism and  for Marx." 
It follows f rom all o f  this, for Wood, that  one cannot  condemn a society 
as unjust  by using the standards o f  a later or  d i f ferent  society. Thus,  in 
Wood's opinion, slavery, for Marx, must  be accepted as perfectly just  in the 
context o f  ancient society despite the fact that it would be unjust in a capital- 
ist or socialist society. So also, capitalism must be accepted asjust  despite the 
fact that  socialist society would have a very different  s tandard of  justice. 
Socialist society would not be able to condemn capitalism as unjust because 
its s tandards would not  be rationally applicable to capitalism, s There  are no 
transcuhural  or  transhistorical norms of  justice. 
Wood's views have been rejected by other  writers, among them, Husami. 
The  latter cites many passages where Marx, if he does not actually say that 
capitalism is unjust, certainly employs the sort o f  language typically used in 
moral condemnat ion .  Husami also claims that Wood overlooks a crucial 
matter. Husami agrees that the moral standards o f  any epoch are, as Wood 
holds, de te rmined  by the given mode of  production,  hut  they are also, and 
Wood does not  see this, de termined by class structure, i.e., by the conditions, 
consciousness, and interests o f  particular classes. Thus,  while capitalism will 
be jus t  for the capitalist class by capitalist standards, it will be unjust for the 
proletariat by proletarian s tandards?  
It is also the case, for Husami,  that  f rom the proletarian perspective the 
capitalist's appropria t ion o f  surplus value is unjust. Moreover, Husami finds 
no evidence to suggest that  it is illegitimate, in Marx's view, to j udge  an 
earlier or  d i f ferent  society by an independent  moral standard.  In fact, he 
thinks that  we can find Marx doing so)  
The  disagreement  between Wood and Husami, on the surface at least, 
appears direct, s traightforward,  and clear cut. It seems that we must simply 
decide which view is correct. In reality, however, the mat ter  is not so simple. 
In some respects both writers are correct; in other respects both are wrong. 
But more importantly,  neither sees the full picture. Each is attacking the 
issue one-sidedly and  peripherally. 
"Critique," t9-2~. Also see Cap/ta/(hereafter C), ed. F. Engels (New York: International, 
t967), I: 193---94 and for the German see Ma~ Engel~ Werke (hereafter MEW) (Berlin: Dietz, 
197tff.), ~3: ~o8. 
3 "Critique," 18-19. "Reply," t3t-39. Brenkert also holds this view at least as far as justice 
in concerned; see G. G. Brenkert, "Freedom and Private Property in Marx," in MJH, 8o-lo 5. 
4 Z. I. Husami, "Marx on Distributive Justice," in MJH, 43ff., 47-5 o. G. Young also op- 
poses Wood's views. See "Doing Marx Justice," Ma~ and Mora//ty, ed. K. Nielsen and S. C. 
Patten, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume VII (1981), 95t--68. 
5 Husami, 4 9 - 5  l ,  5 3 - 5 4 ,  59, 66ff. 
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In the "Notes on Adolph Wagner ,"  Marx writes: 
In fact, in my presentation, profit is not 'merely a deduction or "robbery" on the 
labourer.' On the contrary, I present the capitalist as the necessary functionary of 
capitalist production and show very extensively that he does not only 'deduct' or 
'rob,' but forces the production of surplus value, therefore the deducting only helps 
to produce; furthermore, I show in detail that even if in the exchange of commodi- 
ties only equivalents were exchanged, the capitalist--as soon as he pays the labourer 
the real value of his labour-power--would secure with full rights, i.e. the rights 
corresponding to that mode of production, surplus value. But all of this does not 
make 'profit' into a 'constitutive' element of value, but only proves that in the value 
not 'constituted' by the labour of the capitalist, there is a portion which he can 
appropriate 'legally,' i.e. without infringing the rights corresponding to commodity 
exchange. 
When Wood comments  on this passage, he makes a great deal out of  Marx's 
claim that the capitalist appropriates surplus value with full rights, and he 
tries to argue  away the parts of  the passage in which Marx also claims that it 
is a robbery. On the other  hand,  when Husami discusses this passage he 
focuses on the claim that  this appropriat ion is robbery, but discounts the 
claim that  it is also fully in accord with right. 6 1 can see no way around it. In 
this passage Marx says both that the capitalist robs and that he acts in accor- 
dance with right. The  capitalist is acting both justly and unjustly in the same 
act. It is not  legitimate to dismiss one or the other side of  this apparent  
contradiction. Our  task will be much  more difficult than that. To under-  
stand and explain this contradiction and to unravel the dispute between 
Wood and Husami,  we must begin to unders tand the method which Marx 
employs in his later writings for the study of  political economy, something 
which Wood and Husami have not done. A correct unders tanding of  this 
method,  which is outl ined for the first time in the Introduction to the Grund- 
r/sse and which in Capital Marx calls his "dialectic method, ''7 will go a long 
way toward helping us to unders tand  the ethical views to be found in Marx's 
later writings. 
Marx's method  in the Grundrisse does not begin, as it did in the German 
Ideology, by tracing the historical development  of  prodt~ction through its 
different  historical stages, nor  does it even begin by selecting a specific 
6 "Notes on Adolph Wagner," in Texts on Method, trans. T. Carver (New York: ~arnes & 
Noble, 1975i , 186 and MEW, 19: 359-60. "Reply," i 15--18. Husami, 76-77. 
7 G, l, 19 and MEW, u3: u7. 
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epoch which it then studies in a straightforward historical fashion. Instead, it 
begins by isolating--sifting out by comparison and analysis--certain abstract 
and general categories that are more or less common to all epochs of  pro- 
duction. It does not begin historically; it begins conceptually. In each par- 
ticular epoch, it is true, these general characteristics or categories, Marx says, 
"split into different determinations." The task is certainly not to focus on the 
common characteristics as eternal laws independent of  history, but rather to 
see how these general characteristics are determined differently in different 
periods. The point is to distinguish the general from the specific. For ex- 
ample, Marx says that "all production is appropriation of  nature on the part 
of  an individual within and through a specific form of  society." However, he 
then goes on to tell us that in one epoch this appropriation can take the 
form of  communal property and in another the form of  private proper ty)  
Traditional political economy did not begin in this way. It began straight- 
away by studying the real and the concrete--the actual historical period. 
From there it had to move analytically to simple categories o r  abstract gen- 
eral relations. Only at that point could what Marx calls the scientifically 
correct method begin. The correct method starts with these simple concepts, 
works out the relationships that exist between them in modern society, and 
only then works back toward an understanding of  the concrete. At this point 
it is able to grasp the concrete as a "rich totality of  many determinations and 
relations." At the start, all that was possible was a vague and chaotic concep- 
tion of  the whole. The concrete, for Marx, is the organized and articulated 
concentration of  many determinations and relations--it is not given at the 
start for thought, but is the outcome of a process of  comparison, analysis, and 
investigation. Marx admits that the actual concrete is the starting point for 
real historical development as well as for observation, but we can only grasp 
it at the start as a vague and chaotic conception. For science, the concrete is a 
result. The concrete-for-thought must be constructed or reproduced. Only 
then do we achieve through analysis a clear and scientific understanding of  
the concrete. Marx is very careful to point out, however, that the method of  
moving from abstract general categories to the concrete is merely the way in 
which our thought grasps the concrete. It is by no means the way in which 
the concrete is actually produced, as was the case for Hegel. 9 
As we have said these general categories common to more or less all 
epochs of  production are determined differently in particular epochs. The 
categories are transformed historically. In each epoch, Marx says, a particu- 
8 Grundr/sse (hereafter G), trans, M. Nicolaus (London: Allen Lane, 1973), 85-88, 776; for 
the German see Grundr/sse der Kr/t/k der po//t/schen 0konom/e (hereafter GKPO) (Frankfurt: 
Europ~ische Verlagsanstalt, n.d.), 7-1o,  66~. 
9 G, lo0--10~ and GKPO, ~x-~,2. 
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lar form of production predominates. It assigns rank and influence to the 
other elements. It is "a general illumination which bathes all the other col- 
ours and modifies their particularity." Each category is stamped and 
moulded by the particular structure of  the period because the economic 
reality which the category expresses has been transformed in each period. 
The context of interconnected relations is changed by the development 
which the particular form of production undergoes. '~ These categories de- 
velop historically in two important ways. They become more abstract or 
general and they become increasingly subordinate to a complex economic 
structure. 
In earlier less developed economies, the main categories stand out in 
their simplicity and express dominant relations. In more highly developed 
societies, the category expresses subordinate relations of  a more developed 
and complex whole. Compare, for example, money in the form of cattle or 
precious metals in early history to credit or interest in modern society. 
Again, in early history, an individual or clan can simply possess land or goods. 
Only in more developed societies do individuals hold property, and this in- 
volves complex juridical relations determined by and subordinate to a com- 
plex economic structure. Thus, a category can stand out, predominate, and 
express dominant relations of  a less developed economy or it can express the 
subordinate relations of  a more developed one." 
Categories also become more abstract as history progresses. The best 
example of  this is labor. The Physiocrats finally identified labor as the crea- 
tor of  all wealth. But only a particular form of labor, agricultural labor, was 
taken to be the creator of  all wealth. Later, Adam Smith identified labor in 
general--not a particular form of labor, but all forms of labor--as the 
creator o f  wealth. It was only possible for Smith to make this advance, Marx 
thinks, in a society where no specific form of labor was any longer predomi- 
n a n t - i n  a developed capitalist economy where individuals transfer easily 
from one form of  labor to another and where the individual is relatively 
indifferent to the specific form of  labor. The most general abstractions arise 
only in a complex society "where one thing appears common to many, to all. 
Then it ceases to be thinkable in a particular form alone." Abstract labor is 
not merely a product of  abstract thought. Labor in reality has become ab- 
s t rac t - labor  in general creates wealth and labor is no longer linked to a 
specific form."  
Also, Marx holds that the development of  exchange value to its abstract 
lo G, lo  7 also 776 a n d  GKPO, 27, 662. 
11 G, 1o2 and  GKPO, 2~-23 .  
19 G, 1o 4 and  GKPO, ~4-25 .  
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purity and generality presupposes a mode of  production in which the indi- 
vidual product is no longer produced directly to satisfy a particular need of  
the producer. Exchange value develops only in a complex market economy 
where products are produced for exchange, thus, where the producer be- 
comes increasingly indifferent to what particular sort of  thing is produced 
and is only concerned with the exchange value to be gotten through the sale 
of  the product. '3 
We can thus see that abstract categories, with which the scientifically 
correct method must begin, can only achieve their higher development, 
reach higher abstraction, in highly developed and complex societies which 
arise relatively late in history. .4 In some cases, it is not even possible to grasp 
a category earlier in history. For example, Marx points to Aristotle, who 
argued that exchange "cannot take place without equality and equality not 
without commensurability . . . .  Here, however, he [Aristotle] comes to a stop, 
and gives up the analysis of  the form of value." For Aristode, it was impossi- 
ble that "unlike things can be commensurable,--i.e., qualitatively equal. Such 
an equalisation can only be something foreign to their nature. '''s Why was 
Aristotle unable to grasp the category of  value? Why was he unable to see 
that different commodities can be equal to each other in value if they both 
required equal amounts of  labor for their production? Marx says, there was 
"an important fact which prevented Aristotle from seeing that, to attribute 
value to commodities, is merely a mode of  expressing all labour as equal 
human labour, and consequendy as labour of  equal quality. Greek society 
was founded on slavery . . . .  The secret of  the expression of  value, namely, 
that all kinds of  labour are equal and equiva lent . . ,  cannot be deciphered 
until the notion of  human equality has already acquired the fixity of  a 
popular prejudice. ' '6 
Thus, the scientifically correct method must be able to start with highly 
developed abstract categories in order to work out the interconnections be- 
tween them and thus to understand modern society, and also, as we see in 
Marx's discussion of  Aristode's attempt to understand the concept of  value, 
so that the method can come to understand past societies in a way in which 
at times they could not understand themselves. For Marx, 
Bourgeois society is the most developed and the most complex historic organization 
of production. The categories which express its relations, the comprehension of its 
structure, thereby, also allows insights into the structure and relations of production 
of all vanished social formations out of whose ruins and elements it built itself up, 
13 G, 251-52  and GKPO, 163-64.  
14 G, 1o 3 and GKPO, 23-24 .  
i 5 C, I : 59-6o and MEW, 23: 73-74. Also see Aristotle, Nicomachean Eth/c.s, 1133b. 
16 Ibid. 
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whose partly still unconquered remnants are carried along within it, whose mere 
nuances have developed explicit significance within it, etc. Human anatomy contains 
a key to the anatomy of the ape. The intimations of higher development among the 
subordinate animal species, however, can be understood only after the higher devel- 
opment is already known. The bourgeois economy thus supplies the key to the 
ancient, etc. 
Just as Cuvier could reconstruct the entire anatomy of  a particular animal 
from one of  its bones, since he knew the higher fully developed structure of  
the species, '7 or jus t  as "relics o f  bygone instruments of  labour possess the 
same importance for the investigation of  extinct economic forms of  society 
as do fossil bones for the determinat ion of  extinct species o f  animals, '''g so 
given an unders tand ing  of  mode rn  categories and their interconnections we 
can begin to unders tand  past societies. 
An unders tanding  of  categories and their interconnection in modern  
society is necessary in the way that for some contemporary philosophers of  
science a paradigm is necessary before it becomes possible to empirically 
study the phenomena  under  consideration. Moreover, this paradigm or  ar- 
ticulated structure o f  categories makes it possible to unders tand and illumi- 
nate the specific determinat ion of  categories in earlier societies. One can see 
what is missing (as in the case o f  Aristotle or the Physiocrats discussed 
above), and one can identify elements which have been modified, trans- 
formed,  or  even inverted. 
One must start with the highly developed categories of  modern  society. 
One cannot  begin by s tudying the categories which express earlier forms of  
society and  hope to trace their  development  to modern  society. For example, 
if one begins by studying the feudal period, one will discover that landed 
property predominates  over other  forms of  production and that they are 
dependent  upon it. Moreover, it will appear that only agricultural labor 
creates wealth. In capitalism, landed property and agriculture become sub- 
ordinate forms of  production.  The  relationship becomes inverted. Landed 
property becomes a branch of  capital and industry, and, of  course, one 
finally sees that labor in general  creates wealth. Marx also adds that ground 
rent, derived from landed property,  "cannot be understood without capital. 
But capital can certainly be unders tood  without ground rent." For the scien- 
titleally correct method,  "it would therefore  be unfeasible and wrong to let 
the economic categories follow one another  in the same sequence as that in 
t 7 6;, 1o5, also 776 and GKPO, ~5-26, 662. Also C, 1: 8- 9 and MEW, 23: 12. For a 
discussion of Cuvier's method see G. W. F. Hegel, Hegel's Philosophy of Nature, trans. J. Petty 
(London: Allen & Unwin, t97o ), 3:178-84 and for the German see S/im/hcht Wer/~, ed. H. 
GIockner (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann, 1965ff. ), 9: 674-84. 
18 s  i: t 7 9 - 8 o a n d M E W  , a3: 194. 
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w h i c h  t h e y  w e r e  h i s t o r i c a l l y  d e c i s i v e .  T h e i r  s e q u e n c e  is d e t e r m i n e d  r a t h e r  by  
t h e i r  r e l a t i o n  t o  o n e  a n o t h e r  in  m o d e r n  b o u r g e o i s  soc ie ty ,  w h i c h  is p r e c i s e l y  
t h e  o p p o s i t e  o f  t h a t  w h i c h  s e e m s  to  b e  t h e i r  n a t u r a l  o r d e r  o r  w h i c h  c o r r e -  
s p o n d s  t o  t h e i r  h i s t o r i c a l  d e v e l o p m e n t .  ' ' 9  A g a i n ,  M a r x  says  t h a t  t h e  h i s t o r i -  
ca l ly  e a r l i e r  f o r m  o f  m e r c h a n t ' s  c ap i t a l ,  "is i n c a p a b l e  by i t se l f  o f  p r o m o t i n g  
a n d  e x p l a i n i n g  t h e  t r a n s i t i o n  f r o m  o n e  m o d e  o f  p r o d u c t i o n  to  a n o t h e r .  
W i t h i n  cap i t a l i s t  p r o d u c t i o n  m e r c h a n t ' s  c ap i t a l  is r e d u c e d  f r o m  its f o r m e r  
i n d e p e n d e n t  e x i s t e n c e  to  a spec i a l  p h a s e  in t h e  i n v e s t m e n t  o f  c a p i t a l  . . . .  
T h e  spec i a l  soc ia l  c o n d i t i o n s  t h a t  t a k e  s h a p e  w i t h i n  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  
19 G, lO 7 and GKPO, ~7-28. As we have seen, Marx's method requires that we begin with 
the highly developed categories which express our own epoch and that we work up the para- 
digm which allows us to understand this epoch as well as its past history. The question arises 
here as to why we should privilege our own epoch and its categories or, in general, why later 
epochs and their categories should be privileged over earlier ones. Even worse, it would seem to 
follow that if we accept Marx's method, future epochs and their categories would be privileged 
over our own. The point here, I think, is that any history must be written from a standpoint. 
Marx, who wants to understand his own epoch, quite reasonably takes that epoch as his stand- 
point. Part of explaining it requires that we understand its historical development. There is no 
teleology here. We are simply looking back in history to explain what made it possible for us to 
reach our present standpoint. However, it is clear that a good deal depends on what standpoint 
one adopts. Explaining the way in which different epochs arise will require us to draw and 
throw into relief different factors in the past to explain how these different epochs arose. Very 
clearly, if we began from the standpoint, say, of an earlier epoch, then, as Marx himself admits, 
in looking back to explain how this highpoint was produced, we would pick out and throw into 
relief very different elements in past history to explain it than we would if we were trying to 
explain our present standpoint. It would also follow, very dearly, that if at some point in the 
future we tried to explain our own epoch--our  future epoch--we would again pick out and 
throw into relief very different elements in the past than we would in explaining our present 
epoch. This would be the case even for those parts of the past which overlapped for these 
different standpoints. "However, I think that Marx would hold that at least this method would 
remain the same--it would be the correct method at all periods or from all standpoints--though 
what it would discover would be quite different and would differ relative to the standpoint 
adopted. 
It seems legitimate to say that later epochs and their categories (with some possible excep- 
tions, e.g., a dark age which fell below the level of earlier epochs) would generally be privileged 
over earlier ones. Afterall the later epoch would have available to it what earlier epochs had 
discovered and the later epoch could in explaining itself and indeed in order to explain itself go 
on to discover new things about the past which had never been seen before or could solve 
problems which past epochs could not solve (e.g., Aristode's inability to understand the concept 
of value). Without a doubt there is a certain amount of relativism implied in this method. Any 
epoch will be blind to certain things that later epochs can perceive and different epochs will see 
the past differently, even the same past. Nevertheless, there is a sense in which we can speak 
plausibly of progress here. Later epochs not only can understand past epochs and the way these 
past epochs have interpreted both themselves and their past, but later epochs can also see the 
degree to which the outlooks of  these past epochs help or hinder our understanding of  our own 
present, and most importantly later epochs can build upon all of  this. It seems to me that we can 
speak of a certain amount of progress here, I will not say in 'objectivity', but at least in reducing 
relativism. 
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merchant's capital are no longer paramount. On the contrary, whenever 
merchant's capital still predominates we find backward conditions. ''*~ 
We must also notice that in the Grunclrisse and Capital Marx operates with 
a concept of  essence. In Capital, Marx tells us that "all science would be 
superfluous if the outward appearance and the essence of  things directly 
coincided."" He tells us that surface phenomena are quite different from 
the concealed essence of  things. He also says that it is a "paradox that the 
earth moves around the sun, and that water consists of  two highly inflam- 
mable gases. Scientific truth is always paradox judged by everyday experi- 
ence which catches only the delusive appearance of  things. ''.2 
One of  the many reasons why this distinction between essence and ap- 
pearance is necessary, is to enable us to understand the category of  value. It 
is quite clear that value is to be considered an essence behind surface ap- 
pearance. Marx tells us that "market-price of  production . . .  diverges con- 
siderably f r o m . . ,  market-value. All these phenomena seem to contradict 
the determination of  value by labour-time . . . .  Thus everything appears re- 
versed in competition. The final pattern of  economic relations as seen on the 
s u r f a c e . . ,  is very much different from, and indeed quite the reverse of, 
their inner but concealed essential pattern and the conception correspond- 
ing to it." And also, " V a l u e . . .  does not stalk about with a label describing 
what it is. It is value, rather, that converts every product into a social hiero- 
glyphic. Later on, we try to decipher the hieroglyphic, to get behind the 
secret of  our own social products . . . .  -,3 As we have already seen, Aristode 
was unable to discover this hidden essence. That  could be accomplished only 
in a higher more complex society where categories had reached higher levels 
of  development. We must also see that the scientifically correct method seeks 
this inner essence behind phenomenal appearance. The method does not 
begin with an empirical study of  a historical period--the vague and chaotic 
surface appearance of  the real and concrete. It begins with abstract catego- 
ries gotten by analysis and it works these categories into an interconnected 
structure which grasps an essence: Only then does it return to the study of  
the actual empirical concrete. The first volume of  Capital begins by studying 
such abstract categories (e.g., the commodity, value, labor), and, as Marx 
tells us in the third volume of  Capital, slowly works back toward the phe- 
nomenal surface of  society (e.g., to prices, profit, rate of  profit). '4 Marx tells 
~o C, 3 :397  and MEW, 25: 339. 
a l  C, 3: 817, also 2o 9 and  MEW, 95:825,  2t  9. 
2a Value, Price, and Profit (hereafter VPP), ed. E. M. Aveling (New York: International, 
1935), 37 and MEW, 16: 1~9. 
23 C, 3 : 2 o 9  and MEW, 25: 2~ 9. C, l :  74 and  MEW, 23: 88. 
~4 C, 1 :8  and MEW, 23: 12. C, 3 :~5  and  MEW, ~5: 33. 
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us, in Cap/to/, that  "a scientific ana ly s i s . . ,  is not possible, before we have a 
conception o f  the inner  na ture  o f  capital, just  as the apparent  motions of  the 
heavenly bodies are not intelligible to any but him, who is acquainted with 
their real motions, motions which are not directly perceptible by the senses. ''~s 
To  sum up our  findings, we can say that Marx's method involves four  
principles: (1) One  begins not  with an empirical and historical study of  
society, but with abstract categories obtained by analysis. (2) As these cate- 
gories are t ransformed th rough  history, they become more abstract and 
general, and they become increasingly subordinate to a complex economic 
structure. (3) When one has discovered the interconnection of  categories in 
modern  society and worked them into a paradigm, only then does it be- 
come possible to gain a clear empirical unders tanding of  modern  society 
and also a clear unders tand ing  of  past societies. (4) This categorial struc- 
ture grasps the essence o f  things behind surface appearance. 
2 .  
So far we have considered Marx's method solely as a method for the study of  
political economy. However,  Marx either tells us or  implies that it also ap- 
plies to religion, mathematics,  natural science, and astronomy. '~ I f  we look 
carefully we can also see that  he applies it to ethics. In Capital, Marx writes: 
But original sin is at work everywhere. As capitalist production, accumulation, and 
wealth become developed, the capitalist ceases to be the mere incarnation of capital. 
He has a fellow feeling for his own Adam, and his education gradually enables him 
to smile at the rage for asceticism, as a mere prejudice of the old-fashioned miser. 
While the capitalist of the classical type brands individual consumption as a sin 
25 C, 1 :316 and MEW, 23: 335. Also C, 3 : 4 8  and MEW, 25:57-58 .  Marx's concept of an 
essence in the Economic and Philosophic Manuscrip~ was quite different from what it is in the 
Grunddue and Capital. In the earlier text Marx wanted to derive all appearance from a meta- 
physical essence and he took existence to be the realization of essence--the form of existence 
was even caused by the essence (see Marx-Engels Collected Works [New York: International, 1975 
fT.], 3: 279--81, 284-86, 288-93 and MEW, Erg. I: 52o--21, 524-26, 528-33). But in the 
Grundris~ Marx is perfectly d e a r  that  discovering the interconnection of categories---grasping 
the essence--is simply a method, the way our  mind works; it has nothing to do with the actual 
generation of the actual concrete (G, lo l  and GKPO, 22). Here essences are not metaphysical 
entities. They arise out of  social processes and, as we shall see, disappear with the disappearance 
of those processes. Essences, strange as it may sound, are deeper  forms of appearance. Catego- 
ries and their interconnection are, on the one hand,  the essence behind surface phenomena 
which turns a vague and chaotic conception into a dea r  and coherent scientific understanding, 
and, on the other  hand,  are appearances of  the real social processes of the actual concrete which 
can change or disappear as these social processes are historically transformed. For a fuller 
discussion of this ra ther  complex matter, see my "Marx's Dialectic Method," H i s ~  and Theot3, 
19 (198o): 294-319. 
26 G, 1o6, 46o-61 and GKPO, 26, 364-65. VPP, 37 and MEW, 16:129.  C, 3 : 8 1 7  and 
MEW, 25:825.  C, x: 316 and MEW, 23: 335. 
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against his function and as "abstinence" from accumulating, the modernized capital- 
ist is capable o f  looking upon accumulation as "abstinence" from pleasure . . . .  A t  the 
historical dawn of  capitalist product ion--and every capitalist upstart has personally to 
go through this historical stage--avarice, and desire to get rich, are the ruling pas- 
sions. But the progress of  capitalist production not only creates a world of  delights; it 
lays open, in speculation and the credit system, a thousand sources of  sudden enrich- 
ment. When a certain stage of  development has been reached, a conventional degree 
of  prodigality, which is also an exhibition o f  wealth, and consequently a source of  
credit, becomes a business necessity to the "unfortunate" capitalist. Moreover the 
capitalist gels rich, not like the miser, in proportion to his personal labour and 
restricted consumption, but at the same rate as he squeezes out of  the labour-power 
of  others, and enforces on the labourer abstinence from all life's enjoyments. ~7 
If  we look closely, we can see Marx employing his method here. To make 
this clearer, let us recall something from the "Comments on James Mill" of  
x844. There, Marx claimed that the credit system perverted virtue. For 
example, trustworthiness, rather than standing out as a value in its own right 
and as an end-in-itself, became subordinate to the credit system. It became a 
means to get credit or a guarantee that loans would be repaid. '8 So also here 
in Capital, the original virtue of  abstinence gives way to prodigality as capital- 
ism develops. Moreover, this transformation is produced hy the credit sys- 
tem. The display of  wealth becomes a business necessity--it insures good 
credit. Behavior becomes increasingly subordinate to and is transformed by 
complex economic processes. Virtues no longer stand out as accomplish- 
ments of  the individual. Rather, the individual's behavior is regulated in 
accordance with necessities imposed by a complex state of affairs. Further- 
more, the capitalist's desire for wealth is no longer realized through his own 
particular and personal effort, but through a complex and abstract process 
of  squeezing wealth out of the labor power of  others. 
If  we look closely at certain categories connected with morality--the cate- 
gories of  equality and freedom--we cart get an even better view of Marx's 
method at work. We can see that these categories are transformed in differ- 
ent periods of  production. They become more abstract and increasingly 
subordinate to a complex social structure. Marx says: "Equality and freedom 
as developed to this extent are exacdy the opposite of the freedom and 
equality in the world of  antiquity, where developed exchange value was not 
their basis, but where, rather, the development of  that basis destroyed them. 
Equality and freedom presuppose relations of  production as yet unrealized 
in the ancient world and in the Middle Ages." Equality and freedom are 
produced as individuals become subordinate to and determined by the com- 
27 C, t: 593-94 and MEW, 23: 619-2o. 
9 8 "Comments on James Mill," in Marx Engels Collected Works (New York: International, 
1975f['), 3:1t14--15 and MEW, Erg. I, 448-49. 
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plex economic structure of  the market. With the development of  capitalist 
exchange and exchange value, all buyers and sellers meet freely in the mar- 
ketplace as equals. "9 This relationship is abstract in two different senses. It is 
abstract in the sense of  being universal or  general---a/./individuals meet as 
free equals in the marketplace. It is also abstract in the sense that capitalism 
abstracts from all characteristics of  individuals except their equality and 
freedom in the marketplace. In other respects they may not at all be equal 
and free. 
Capitalist equality is limited and imperfect. Moreover, it will not explain 
the higher development of  equality to be found in socialist society. For 
Marx, as we recall, the categories of  one stage will neither explain nor 
produce the development o f  a higher stage. Marx criticizes socialists like 
Proudhon who seek to realize the sort of  equality and freedom which exist as 
ideals in capitalist society but which they think have merely been perverted 
in practice, "The proper  reply to them is: that exchange value or, more 
precisely, the money system is in fact the system of  equality and freedom, 
and that the disturbances which they encounter in the further development 
of  the system are disturbances inherent in it, are merely the realization of  
equality and freedom which prove to be inequality and unfreedom. ''a~ For 
example, Marx rejects the view that it is possible to realize an equality of  
wages within capitalist society: 
Upon the basis of the wages system the value of labouring power is settled like that of 
every other commodity; and as different kinds of labouring power have different 
values..,  they must fetch different prices in the labour market. To clamour for 
equal or even equitable retribution on the basis of the wages system is the same as to 
clamour for freedom on the basis of the slavery system, s~ 
For Marx, we cannot use a capitalist notion of  equality to explain or promote a 
higher form of equality. However, in the first stage of  communist society, the 
principle of  equal right is finally achieved without principle and practice 
being at loggerheads. An equality of  wages is finally achieved at least in the 
sense that what individuals draw from the social stock of  means of  consump- 
tion is in equal proportion to the labor time which the individuals contr ibute) '  
However, this equal right will still be, Marx thinks, a right o f  inequality. 
Given individuals with unequal endowment and unequal productive capac- 
ity, inequality will result. 
z9 G, 245-46 and GKPO, 156--57. C, 1:t68 and MEW, 23: ]89. 
3 ~ G, 248--49 and GKPO, 160. 
31 VPP, 39 and MEW, 16: 131-32. 
32 "Critique of the Gotha Program" (hereafter "Gotha'), in The Minx-Engels Reader, 2d 
edition, ed. R. C. Tucker (New York: Norton, 1972), 53 ~ and MEW, 19: 20. 
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Right by its very nature can consist only in the application of an equal standard; but 
unequal individuals (and they would not be different individuals if they were not 
unequal) are measurable only by an equal standard in so far as they are brought 
under an equal point of view, are taken from one definite side only, for instance, in 
the present case are regarded only as workers and nothing more is seen in them, 
everything else being ignored. Further, one worker is married, another not; one has 
more children than another, and so on and so forth . . . .  To avoid all these defects, 
right instead of being equal would have to be unequal, s~ 
Here,  equality is still abstract--both in the sense that it is universal and in the 
sense that we abstract f rom all characteristics of  the individual except the 
fact that the individual is a worker contributing a certain amount  of  labor 
time. This latter form of  abstraction is finally overcome in the second stage 
of  communis t  society where goods will be distributed in proportion to the 
concrete needs of  the individual. There  the individual will be treated as a 
concrete being, not an abstraction. 
However, in the second stage o f  communist  society, it might seem that 
equality is done away with. This society will operate on the principle, "From 
each according to his ability, to each according to his needs!" Brenkert  
argues that here Marx leaves behind the principle of  equal right because, as 
Marx says, "Right by its very nature  can consist only in the application of  an 
equal s tandard."  Since the principle of  "to each according to his needs" is 
not a principle o f  equality, Marx abandons equal rights. Wood also makes a 
similar point. ~4 1 cannot  agree with Brenkert  and Wood here. It seems to me 
that  the second stage o f  communism embodies a t ransformed concept o f  
equality. Aristotle, for  example,  distinguished between arithmetic and geo- 
metric equality. Arithmetical equality requires that individuals receive strictly 
equal shares. The  way A is treated is simply the same as the way B is treated. 
Geometrical equality only requires equal proportionality as when A is to B as 
X is to Y. Individuals o f  greater worth are due more, but equally in propor- 
tion to their worth. So the share of  A is to the share of  B as X is to Y, where 
X and Y are qualities of, respectively, A and B. This, it seems to me, is the 
principle Marx is adopt ing for the second stage of  communism. However, 
for Marx, it is not a person's class, status, wealth, or even virtue which 
determines the amoun t  due  them, but  simply their needs. 
Thus,  in the second stage o f  communist  society, the bourgeois form of  
equal right will be transcended.  Marx also speaks of  this concept of  equal 
right as being among  "ideas which in a certain period had some meaning but 
33 "Cot.ha," 530--31 and MEW, 19: 21. 
34 Ibid. Brenkert, 9 t. "Reply," t31. 
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have now b e c o m e  obsole te  verbal  rubbish.  ''3s Thus ,  it is clear  tha t  this gen-  
eral  c o n c e p t  is d e t e r m i n e d  d i f fe ren t ly  in d i f f e ren t  pe r iods  a n d  tha t  the  
concep t  becomes  m o r e  abst ract ,  in the  sense o f  being appl icable  in a m o r e  
universal  way, as it a p p r o a c h e s  c o m m u n i s t  society. Howeve r ,  it finally ceases 
to be abstract  in the  sense tha t  we cons ide r  only  one  aspect  o f  the  individual  
in abst ract ion f r o m  the  o the rs .  Equal i ty  moves  f r o m  be ing  an  abs t rac t  uni-  
versal to be ing  a conc re t e  universa l  as it app roaches  c o m m u n i s t  soc ie ty - - jus t  
as the  m e t h o d  moves  f r o m  the  cons ide ra t ion  o f  abstract  ca tegor ies  to a g rasp  
o f  the concre te .  
Marx  also discusses just ice .  H e  writes:  
The justice of  the transactions between agents o f  production rests on the fact that 
these arise as natural consequences out of  the production relationships. The juristic 
forms in which these economic transactions appear as willful acts o f  the parties 
concerned, as expressions o f  their common will and as contracts that may be en -  
forced by law against some individual party, cannot, being mere forms, determine 
this content. They merely express it. This content is just whenever i.t corresponds, is 
appropriate, to the mode of  production. It is unjust whenever it contradicts that 
mode. Slavery on the basis o f  capitalist production is unjust; likewise fraud in the 
quality of  commodities, s6 
It  is also c lear  tha t  as mater ia l  condi t ions  develop,  concep t ions  o f  jus t ice  
are  t r a n s f o r m e d  in the  s a m e  way as with o t h e r  categories.  I n  m o d e r n  society, 
fo r  Marx,  jus t ice  b e c o m e s  increas ingly  d e t e r m i n e d  by and  s u b o r d i n a t e  to 
abstract  social processes.  Marx  tells us tha t  in feudal  society the  d i f f e r ence  
be tween necessary  l abor  f o r  which  the w o r k e r  was paid a n d  surp lus  l abor  fo r  
which the  w o r k e r  was no t  pa id  s tood ou t  clearly and  visibly, " the  l abou r  o f  
35 "Gotha," 53 t and MEW, 19: 91-29. It may seem that when Marx rejects equal right he 
is rejecting all forms of equality, but I do not think this is the case. Consider the following 
passage: "Thus, what all this wisdom comes down to is the attempt to stick fast at the simplest 
economic relations, which conceived by themselves, are pure abstractions . . . .  What this re- 
veals.., is the foolishness of those socialists (namely the French, who want to depict socialism as 
the realization of the ideals of bourgeois society articulated by the French Revolution) who 
demonstrate that exchange and exchange value etc. are originally (in time) or essentially (in 
their adequate form) a system of universal freedom and equality, but that they have been 
perverted by money, capital, etc." He goes on to say that, as capitalism develops, this equality 
and freedom turn into inequality and unfreedom (G, 248--49 and GKPO, 169). What Marx 
objects to here is that these socialists fasten upon general abstractions without paying attention 
to how they are historically transformed and determined in different periods. So also, I think, 
when Marx speaks of equal right as being among "ideas which in a certain period had some 
meaning but have now become obsolete verbal rubbish" his objection again is to fastening upon 
moral categories which in the past had some meaning but which have now been transformed 
and have lost that meaning. Marx objects to fixing upon such categories as general unchanging 
abstractions and taking them as ideals capable of being realized in (or of promoting) a higher 
form of society. To reject an outmoded concept of equal right on these grounds does not in any 
way suggest that he would reject a transformed concept of equality--geometrical equality. 
36 C, 5: 339-4o ,  also 3 8 5 - 8 6  and MEW, 2 5 : 3 5 1 - 5 2 ,  398-99- 
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the worker for himself, and his compulsory labour for his lord, differ in 
space and time in the clearest possible way." The laborer may even perform 
the work on two distinct plots of  ground, one his own and the other his 
lord's, or he may perform entirely different sorts of labor for himself and 
for his lord. Such a clear distinction is not visible in capitalist society. The 
worker simply labors for a certain number of hours and is paid for a day's 
work. The difference between necessary labor which is paid and surplus 
labor which is not is unclear. The worker appears to be paid simply for the 
whole day's labor. This appearance "forms the basis of  all juridical notions of 
both labourer and capitalist . . . .  The  exchange between capital and labour at 
first presents itself to the mind in the same guise as the buying and selling of  
all other commodities. The buyer gives a certain sum of  money, the seller an 
article of  nature different from money. The jurist's consciousness recognizes 
this, at most, as a material difference . . . .  ,,sT The juridical consciousness 
abstracts from all relations except those between buyer and seller, and this 
forms the basis for all juridical notions--which thus would include the no- 
tion of justice. Thus, under  capitalism, the concept of  justice as free ex- 
change of  equivalents comes to be determined by and  subordinate to com- 
plex, obscure, and abstract social processes. 
We have seen that Marx's treatment of these categories follows the 
method outlined in the Grundrisse, at .least in the sense that these categories 
undergo development and transformation through history, and that, at least 
up to capitalist society, they become increasingly abstract and subordinate to 
complex social processes. Moreover, it is also clear that Marx has changed 
his mind on an important issue. In the Communist Manifesto, he registered the 
objection of  a hypothetical bourgeois, " 'Undoubtedly,' it will be said, 'reli- 
gious, moral, philosophical and juridical ideas have been modified in the 
course of  historical development.' But religion, morality, philosophy, politi- 
cal science, and law constantly survived this change." Marx then went on to 
reject this claim and to hold that such religious, moral, and legal notions 
would disappear in communist society, ss It is now clear that Marx no longer 
completely rejects the claim made in this quotation. Certainly he still thinks 
that religion will disappear, but he does not think that moral and juridical 
ideas will. His method tries to understand the transformation of concepts 
such as freedom, equality, and justice; he works out a theory of their trans- 
formation; and he holds that these concepts will be fully realized in com- 
munist society. 
It is also clear that Marx applies the methodological principle of distin- 
37 C, l: 539-4 ~ and MEW, ~3: 562-63. 
38 Communist Manifesto, in MECW, 6:5o4 and MEW, 4:48o. 
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guishing between surface phenomena and inner essence to his discussion of  
equality and freedom. In bourgeois society, these categories belong to the 
realm of  surface phenomena, "This simple circulation, considered by itself-- 
and it is the surface of  bourgeois society, obliterating the deeper operations 
from which it arises---reveals no difference between objects of  exchange, 
except formal and temporary ones. This is the realm of  freedom, equality, 
and of  property based on labour. ''s9 Moreover, this liberty and equality, 
which appear as surface phenomena, disappear at the level of  essence. "In 
present bourgeois society as a whole, the positing of  prices and their circula- 
tion etc. appears as a surface process, beneath which, however, in the 
depths, entirely different processes go on, in which this apparent individual 
equality and liberty disappear." This equality and freedom prove to be in- 
equality and unfreedom. 4~ 
We must also nodce that the same distinction applies to the capitalist's 
appropriation of  surplus value. Marx says: "The owner of  the money has 
paid the value of  a day's labour-power; his, therefore, is the use of  it for a 
day; a day's labour belongs to him. The circumstance, that, on the one hand 
the daily sustenance of  labour-power costs only half a day's labour, while on 
the other  hand the very same labour-power can work during the whole day, 
that consequendy the value which its use during the day creates, is double 
what he pays for that use is, without doubt, a piece of  good luck for the 
buyer, but by no means an injury [Unrecht] to the seller. "4' It is not an injury 
or an injustice to the seller because the seller has received the value of  his or 
her labor power. The  exchange was an exchange of  equivalents. Generally 
speaking, for Marx, a transaction is just in capitalist society if it is an ex- 
change of  equivalents and if the transaction was entered into freely. Equality 
and freedom amount  to justice?" 
But when Marx says that this exchange involves no injustice (Unrecht) to 
the seller, we must ask if, like equality and freedom, this is only so at the 
level o f  surface appearance. Marx tells us that "The wage-form . . .  extin- 
guishes every trace o f  the division of  the working-day into necessary and 
surplus labour, into paid and unpaid labour. All labour appears as paid 
l a b o u r . . ,  the unrequited labour of  the wage-labourer" is concealed. 4~ Thus, 
the appearance is that the worker is simply paid the value of  a day's labor 
39 "Marx to Engels on 2 April t858," in Marx Engels Selected Correspondence, ed. S. Ryazan- 
skaya (Moscow: Progress, x955) , lo 7 and MEW, ~9:317 - Also C, 1:540 and MEW, 93: 569. 
4 ~ G, 247-49 and GKPO, ]59-6o. 
41 C, 1: 193-94 andMEW, 23: 2o8. 
42 This is implied at G, ~41 and GKPO, 153. Also VVP, 39-4 ~ and MEW, 16: 13t-39. 
Also, compare C, l: 84, 84n with 168-69; for the German, MEW, 23: 99, 99 n, t8~-83. 
43 C, t: 5 3 9 - 4  o (my emphasis) and MEW, 23: 562. 
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and that the capitalist gains profit by selling the product of  a day's labor on 
the market for more than it cost to produce it. The reality, however, is that 
surplus value is derived, not in circulation, not in the market, but in produc- 
tion. By distinguishing between labor (or a day's labor) and labor power, we 
see that the capitalist pays the value of  labor power in the form of  a wage, 
but pockets the difference between it and the value of the product produced 
by a day's labor and sold on the market. The worker is paid for one part of  
the labor and is not paid for the other part. It is true that the capitalisfs 
profit /s realized in circulation in the sense that the capitalist must success- 
fully sell the product to realize a profit, but nevertJaeless, for Marx, this 
profit is dependent  upon the surplus value produced by the unpaid surplus 
labor of the worker in production. Thus, Marx says, "Surplus-value and rate 
of surplus value, are, relatively, the invisible and unknown essence that 
wants investigating, while rate of  profit and therefore the appearance of 
surplus-value in the form of profit are revealed on the surface of  the pheno- 
mena . . . .  Although the excess value of a commodity over its cost-price is 
shaped in the immediate process of  production, it is realized only in the 
process of  circulation, and appears all the more readily tr have arisen from 
the process of  circulation . . . .  ,,4~ 
When Marx argues that the contract between the capitalist and the 
worker was not an Unrecht to the latter, he can argue this because the con- 
tract was entered into 'freely' and it involved an exchange of  equivalents. All 
other aspects of  this relationship are ignored in capitalist society. 45 It is clear 
then that since capitalist equality and freedom are surface phenomena, and 
since equality and freedom in exchange amount to justice, that the right or 
justice on the side of  the capitalist also belongs to the realm of surface 
phenomena. Marx himself says, "we may understand the decisive impor- 
tance of  the transformation of value and price of labour-power into the 
form of  wages, or into the value and price of  labour itself. This phenomenal 
form, which makes the actual relation invisible, and, indeed, shows the direct 
opposite of  that relation, forms the basis of  all juridical notions of both 
labourer and capitalist, of all the mystifications of the capitalist mode of 
production, of  all its illusions as to liberty. ''46 If  all the juridical notions of 
capitalist society are phenomenal forms, so then is its conception of justice. 
And even more clearly, Marx says, "Living labour capacity belongs to itself, 
and has disposition over the expenditure o f  its forces, through exchange. 
Both sides confront each other as persons. Formally, their relation has the 
44 C, 3: 43, also ao 9 and MEW, 25: 53, ~I9- Also G, 255 and GKPO, 166. 
45 See G, s, St and  GKPO, 163. 
46 C, s: 540 and MEW, 23: 562. 
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equality and  f reedom of  exchange as such. As far as concerns the legal 
relation, the fact that this form is a mere semblance, and a deceptive sem- 
blance, appears  as an external  matter.  What  the free worker sells is always 
nothing more  than a specific, particular measure o f  force-expenditure.  "47 
And in general,  " In  present  bourgeois society as a whole, this positing o f  
prices and their  circulation etc. appears as the surface process, beneath 
which, however, in the depths,  entirely di f ferent  processes go on, in which 
this apparen t  individual equality and liberty disappear. ''4. 
We can now see that  the passage from the "Notes on Adolph Wagner," 
where Marx said that the exchange between capitalist and worker was both a 
robbery and also fully in accord with right, means that this exchange accords 
with right at the phenomenal  level o f  surface appearance and that  it is 
robbery in essence? 9 
It should now be clear that  when Wood argues that capitalism is not 
unjust, that the exchange between the worker and the capitalist, is not un- 
just, and When he goes on to marshal evidence to show that this in fact is 
Marx's view, Wood is perfectly correct, though  he only sees the surface half  
of  the issue. Wood does not  at all recognize that capitalism is just  for Marx 
only at the level o f  surface appearance.  Since Wood does not see or cannot 
accept the difference between essence and appearance, he does not see that, 
for Marx, capitalism is also unjust,  and is so in essence. 
On the o ther  hand,  when Husami argues that, for Marx, capitalism /s 
unjust, s~ Husami is also perfectly correct. The re  is, however, a certain ambi- 
guity in Husami 's  article. At times he tries to discount Wood's claim that, for 
Marx, capitalism is just ,  and at certain points he even argues that in some of  
the passages where Marx actually claims that capitalism is just, Marx is speak- 
ing satirically or  ironically. Husami's tendency here would seem to be that 
capitalism is simply unjust.  Nevertheless, at o ther  times, Husami is willing to 
admit  that capitalism appears  just  to capitalists though it will not appear  so to 
the proletariat. Here,  Husami  is closer to the t ruth than Wood is. However, 
Husami's view is that differences in class perspective are what allow capitalism 
to appear  both just  and  unjust.  Husami does not seem to grasp the signifi- 
cance o f  Marx's method,  and  especially the significance of  Marx's distinction 
between essence and appearance,  for the analysis o f  moral categories, s' 
47 G, 464, also 457-58 and GKPO, 368, 36t-69. 
48 G, 247 and GKPO, 159. 
49 "Notes on Wagner," 186 and MEW, 19: 359-6o. 
5o Husami, 43, 45. 
w Husami, 44, 47, 63, 67, 77- In this respect, Buchanan comes closer to moving in the 
right direction; see A. E. Buchanan, Marx andJu.~Sce (Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman & Little- 
field, t98~), 54. 
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Next, we must attend to Wood's claim that for Marx it would be impossi- 
ble to condemn as unjust the institutions of  an earlier society because the 
only standards by which a society can legitimately be judged are those which 
arise from its own mode of  production. Thus, "the holding of  slaves by the 
ancients would be a just practice; and the claim that ancient slavery was 
unjust, whether it is made by contemporaries of  the institution or by modern 
men reading about it in history books, would simply be wrong." In the same 
way, it would be impossible to condemn capitalism on the basis of  a socialist 
standard of  justice, "any such standard would not be rationally applicable to 
capitalism at all, any such condemnations would be mistaken, confused, and 
without foundation. ''s" Wood is simply wrong here. He has not studied the 
method which Marx outlined in the Grundrisse. 
For Marx, we have seen, there are categories which all stages of  produc- 
tion have in common. These characteristics develop and are determined 
differently in different historical periods. If  these categories, once they have 
become highly developed, are worked into a paradigm which ~ grasps and 
expresses modern society, the same paradigm will also allow insight into 
earlier societies just as human anatomy tontains a key to the anatomy of the 
ape. There  will be a difference between earlier and later categories--partly 
unconquered remnants will have been carried along into the modern cate- 
gory and nuances in the earlier categories will have developed explicitly-- 
but since the modern category will be a transformation of  the old, it can give 
us insight into the older category.SS It seems to me that this aspect of  the 
method also applies to ethics. In fact, we can actually find passages where 
Marx does so apply it and where Marx does specifically what Wood prohib- 
its. He judges capitalist society by socialist standards. In the following pas- 
sage, we see a very good example of  how Marx's method allows him both to 
explain the development of  social institutions and to judge them morally: 
It was not, however, the misuse of parental authority that created the capitalistic 
exploitation, whether direct or indirect, of children's labour; but, on the contrary, it 
was the cap~ta~,ist mode of exploitation which, by sweeping away the economic hash of 
parental authority, made its exercise degenerate into a mischievous misuse of power. 
Flowever terrible and disgusting the dissolution, under the capihalist system, of the 
old family ties may appear, nevertheless, modern industry, by assigning as it does an 
important part in the process of production, outside the domestic sphere, to women, 
to young persons, and to children of both sexes, creates a new economic foundation 
for a higher form of the family and of the relations between the sexes. It is, of 
course, just as absurd to hold the Teutonic-Christian form of the family to be abso- 
5 9 "Critique," 18-19, 29, Also "Reply," IO8--109b 130"--31. Brenkert also holds this posi- 
tion; see Brenkert, 89-9o. 
53 G, lo 5, 776 and GKPO, 25-~,6, 662. 
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lute and final as it would be to apply that character to the ancient Roman, the ancient 
Greek, or the Eastern forms, which, moreover, taken together form a series in his- 
torical development . . ,  the fact of the collective working group being composed of 
individuals of both sexes and all ages, must necessarily under suitable conditions, 
become a source of humane development; although in its spontaneously developed, 
brutal, capitalistic form, where the labourer exists for the process of production, and 
not the process of production for the labourer, that fact is a pestiferous source of 
corruption and slavery. 
He re  Marx is compar ing  the capitalist fo rm of  the family to o the r  f o r m s - -  
both earl ier  forms and  a later  "h igher  form o f  the family." Moreover ,  he is 
measuring,  judging ,  the capitalist form by this h igher  form, which is cer- 
tainly the socialist fo rm o f  the family that capitalism is laying the founda t ion  
for. Marx also seems to be do ing  much  the same thing when he'says, "From 
the s tandpoint  o f  a h igher  economic  fo rm o f  society, private ownership  o f  
the globe by single individuals will appea r  quite as absurd  as private owner- 
ship o f  one  man by ano the r .  TM 
It  is t rue that,  t hough  we find some, we do  not  find many passages in 
which, f rom the perspect ive o f  a h igher  socialist morality, Marx condemns  as 
unjust  the institutions o f  earl ier  societies. I suspect, however,  that there  are 
reasons for  this that are  quite  d i f fe ren t  f rom the ones that Wood gives. Marx 
says that to oppose  the welfare o f  the individual to the welfare o f  the species, 
is to assert that the development of the species must be arrested in order to safe- 
guard the welfare of the individual so that, for instance, no war may be waged in 
which at all events some individuals perish . . . .  Apart from the barrenness of such 
edifying reflections, they reveal a failure to understand the fact that, although at first 
the development of  the capacities of the human species takes place at the cost of the 
majority of human individuals, and even classes, in the end it breaks through this 
contradiction and coincides with the development of the individual; the higher devel- 
opment of individuality is thus only achieved by a historical process during which 
individuals are sacrificed for the interests of the species. 55 
Marx, like Hegel  and  Kant ,  thinks that the deve lopment  o f  humani ty  as a 
whole has p roceeded  at the expense  o f  individuals. # I f  this is a t rue  descrip- 
tion o f  what has actually occur red  in history, then despite the fact that past 
societies have been immora l  and unjust, can be co n d emn ed  as such, and 
have been c o n d e m n e d  as such, this immorali ty and injustice cannot  easily be 
54 C, I, 489-9 ~ and MEW, 23: 514. C, 3" 776 and MEW, 25:784. 
55 Thtoriea of Surplus Va/ue, ed. S. Ryazanskaya (Moscow: Progress, 1969), 2: 118 and MEW, 
26, Ix. I1: t i t .  
56 G. W. F. Hegel, Philosophy of HislmT, trans. J. Sibree (New York: Dover, 1956), 25-27 
and Sam/J/the Werke, t t: 54-57- I. Kant, "Idea for a Universal History," in On Histo~, ed. L. W. 
Beck (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, t957), 13-16 and for the German see KanL's ge.mmmeltr 
Sthriften, ed. Royal Prussian Academy of Science (Berlin: Reimer, 191off. ), 8: t9--~2. 
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avoided if the species is to develop. In Marx's view, historical development 
cannot be stopped, and furthermore, the only real hope for humanity is to 
reach the end of  history where finally the contradiction between the individ- 
ual and the species will come to an end. Even in the passage concerning the 
family quoted above, Marx both condemns the dissolution of  the family 
caused by capitalism and at the same time argues that capitalism is laying the 
foundation for a higher form Of the family. Look at the language employed 
by Marx in this passage, "However terrible and disgusting" the dissolution of  
the family under capitalism, "nevertheless," capitalism creates the "foundation 
for a higher form of  the family. ''57 The dissolution of  the family under 
capitalism/s immoral, but it creates the basis of  a higher form of the family. 
Any condemnation of  past society must also recognize that that society is 
laying the foundation of  a higher society. If  the condemnation of  past soci- 
ety implies that it would be best if historical development were to stop, this 
would make impossible a final end to the conflict--the only way to finally 
reconcile the individual and the species. One refrains from a simple con- 
demnation of  past society not because there are no rational grounds for 
doing so, as Wood claims, but because doing so can show a lack of  realism 
and a blindness to the moral end of  history. 
However, it does not follow from this, as Isaiah Berlin claims, that agree- 
ment or disagreement with the advance of  history determines whether or 
not a thing is moral, ss For Marx, things are moral or immoral independently 
of  whether or not they will retard or hasten historical development. Marx 
does not argue that the dissolution of  the family under capitalism should be 
considered moral because it is laying the foundation of  a higher form of  the 
family. I t / s  laying this foundation; nevertheless, it is immoral. Agreement 
with history only determines whether or not something is hopeless, not 
whether or not it is moral. 
Thus, when one claims that capitalism is unjust, one cannot mean that 
capitalism should or could have different standards than the ones which 
correspond to its mode of  production. Nor does it imply that history should 
or could come to a standstill. Nevertheless, one does not want to be caught 
having to say that one thing is just for capitalism and another thing is just 
for socialism so that there is no way to judge the former by the latter's 
57 C, x: 489-9 ~ and MEW, a3: 514. It might seem that Marx is smuggling in a form of 
teleology here, that is, suggesting that history will work toward the goal of creating a higher 
form of the family. But I do not think this is the case. All Marx says is that the development of 
capitalism brings about the economic foundation for a higher form of the family. In other words, 
it creates the conditions which will allow, make it possible, for people themselves to change the 
form of the family in response to the problems they find in the existing form of the family. 
58 1. Berlin, Karl Marx: His Life and Environment (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 
154-55. 
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standards. One wants to be able to say that socialism involves higher stan- 
dards of  justice, ones which capitalism cannot realize or fulfill, but which the 
historical development of  capitalism prepares the ground for. Moreover, the 
development of  this higher standard provides the key to understanding the 
earlier. It allows us to see the shortcomings of  capitalism as well as the way in 
which it is preparing the ground for a higher form of  society. 
. 
It is also the case that Wood's views saddle him with peculiar difficulties. It 
would seem that a socialist party seeking a revolution, if it were to be said to 
act morally, would have to act in accordance with capitalist morality. On 
these grounds, it might well be argued that such a party would have no 
moral right to revolt at all. If, on the other hand, this party chooses not to 
act in accordance with capitalist standards of  morality, then it would seem to 
be the case, on Wood's view of  things, that the actions of  this party would 
simply be immoral. One might then be led to argue that there are not and 
should not be any moral constraints on the party's actions at all, and Wood 
comes very close to holding this view himself. ~9 It may be that such thinking 
goes a long way toward explaining the behavior of  some leftist parties. At 
best, Marx would be put in the position of  Kant, who argued that if a better 
constitution is realized through revolution, it would be wrong to try to over- 
throw the new constitution and return to the old, but, nevertheless, anyone 
caught in the act of  revolt would jusdy deserve the punishment received,6~ a 
position which Marx clearly did not hold. 
Many of  those who write on Marx seem to assume, whether they are fully 
aware of  it or not, that Marx is exclusively, or at least primarily, a theorist of  
revolution. From this assumption, it might seem to follow that everything 
that Marx says, all areas that he investigates, must in some fairly direct way 
be connected with the promotion of  revolution or the realization of  social- 
ism. If  not, then something is wrong: either Marx has been misinterpreted 
or Marx made an error and must be revised. This assumption is especially 
important with regard to consciousness and it has special significance for 
ethics. The assumption that everything must be connected with revolution 
can lead in radically different directions, depending upon whether or not 
one thinks that consciousness is capable of  promoting revolution, but in any 
case it leads to a misreading of  Marx. Some theorists, like Luk~ics and Mar- 
cuse, are led to argue that consciousness--including ethics and aesthetics-- 
59 A. W. Wood, Karl Marx (London: Roudedge & Kegan Paul, 1981), 141--42. 
6o 1. Kant, Perpetual Peace, in On H/story, 12o and Kant's gesammelte Schriften, 8 :37~-73  . 
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does p romote  revolut ion even if  not  in a c rude  and immediate  way) '  
Others,  like Stanley Moore,  think that morality is incapable o f  p romot ing  
social t ransformat ion ,  and argue  that  when Marx does appeal  to morality he 
violates his own principles o f  historical mater ia l ism) ~ Wood, too, seems to 
opera te  with a similar set o f  assumptions: 
To create a "proletarian morality" or "proletarian concept of justice" by disseminat- 
ing a set of ideas which working-class agitators find politically advantageous would 
strike Marx as a shortsighted and self-defeating course for the movement to adopt. It 
is far safer and more efficacious in the long run to rely simply on the genuine 
(non-moral) reasons people have for wanting an obsolete and inhuman social system 
to be overthrown and replaced by a higher form of society;. . ,  changes in the 
prevailing standards of right and justice do not cause social revolutions but only 
accompany them. This, of course, is not to deny that bringing about changes in the 
moral, legal, and political superstructure of society is for Marx an important subordi- 
nate moment of revolutionary practice. But on Marx's theory new standards of right 
come to be valid because revolutionary changes occur in economic relations; it is not 
the case that revolutions do occur or should occur because post-revolutionary stan- 
dards of right are already valid for pre-revoludonary society. 63 
For Wood,  the fact that a h igher  socialist morality cannot  p romote  revo- 
lution is closely connec ted  with the claim that there  can be no valid socialist 
morality until socialism is established and  that capitalism cannot  be judged  
by socialist standards.  
! cannot  accept the widespread assumption that Marx is primarily or  
exclusively a theorist  o f  revolut ion,  no r  can I accept the consequences which 
this assumption has for  morality, namely,  that if morality does not  p romote  
revolution it is illegitimate to appeal  to it. Marx's thought  is not  limited to 
being a theory  o f  revolution.  It  certainly is that, but it is also much more  
than that. His theory  o f  historical materialism, which was first set out  in the 
German Ideology, as well as the revised version o f  it first outl ined in the 
In t roduct ion  to the Grundrisse, makes very general  claims about  the relation- 
ship o f  material  conditions to all forms o f  consciousness--material  condi- 
tions influence consciousness. This  is a general  theory which implicitly de- 
mands that Marx develop,  o r  at least be able to develop, theories of  art, 
religion, law, psychology, science, morality, and indeed all o ther  forms o f  
consciousness. He  must  show how these forms o f  consciousness are influ- 
61 G. Luk;lcs, History and Class Consciousness, trans. R. Livingstone (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
Press, 1971), z, 19--al, 42, 52--53, 7 o. H. Marcuse, An Essay on liberation (Boston: Beacon, 
1969), 37-38; The Aesthe~ Dimension (Boston: Beacon, 1978), xi-xiii, a. 
62 S. Moore, "Marx and Lenin as Historical Materialists," in MJH, 21 aft., 23a-33. "Gotha," 
531 (my emphasis) and MEW, 19: 2l. 
63 "Reply," 132-33. "Critique," 3 o. Also Karl Marx, 126ff. 
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enced by material conditions. If  this cannot be. shown, then Marx cannot 
maintain his doctrine of  historical materialism. Moreover, Marx is obliged to 
develop these theories whether or not the forms of  consciousness they de- 
scribe will serve to promote revolution. If  there is some connection between 
material conditions and consciousness, he must show that connection, and it 
is not in the least obvious that in all cases these forms of  consciousness will 
promote revolution. Marx denies that religious consciousness will promote 
revolution. Must psychology? Must art? Must mathematics? I do not think 
that for Marx ethics is expected to promote revolution. Nevertheless Marx is 
obliged to have a theory of  ethics. He says that the proletariat should "vindi- 
cate," not reject, "the simple laws of  morals and justice which ought to 
govern the relations between individuals." In Capital, he also says that indi- 
viduals "may subjectively raise themselves above" their social conditions. He 
is saying, I think, that they can morally raise themselves above their social 
conditions. Yet at the same time Marx goes on to say that he does not think 
the individual can be held "responsible for the relations whose creature he 
socially remains. ''64 In other words, morality is quite possible and has an 
important place despite the fact that it alone cannot transform social condi- 
tions or  promote revolution. There  is simply nothing wrong with this unless 
you hold that historical materialism is only a theory of  revolution and that 
everything must contribute to revolution or lose its legitimacy. 
Stanford University 
64 Civil War in France, in Writings on the Paris Commune, ed. H. Draper (New York: Monthly 
Review Press, 197~ ), 35 and MEW, 17: 3; C, l: lO and MEW, 23: 16. It is even conceivable that 
a political party could find itself in a position where what is moral is at odds with what social 
conditions require for the defence or advancement of the class it represents. And it may be the 
case that this party does what social conditions require rather than what morality demands. But 
this is no reason to decide, as Berlin and others think Marx does, to call such action moral. Nor 
is it a reason to decide to call it non-moral, as Wood would have it. It is simply immoral. As we 
have seen, in his discussion of the family and of  the development of the human species, Marx 
made it quite clear that acting morally, certainly acting in accordance with a higher morality, is 
not always possible at all stages of history. Yet at the very least such regrettable situations should 
serve to hasten our work for the development of  social conditions that will be compatible with 
moral action. 
